This paper studies the role of capital investment in a search and matching model. I develop an endogenous job separation matching model in which a …rm's irreversible capital investment is endogenously determined. The incorporation of capital investment provides an additional channel for …rms to respond to productivity shocks, signi…cantly magnifying labor market ‡uctuations. The numerical results demonstrate that the incorporation of irreversible capital investment improves the ability of the standard search and matching model to generate cyclical ‡uctuations of unemployment and vacancies in response to productivity shocks. Moreover, my model can generate the pro-cyclicality of vacancies, which the standard endogenous separation models often fail to generate.
Introduction
The Mortensen-Pissarides search and matching model (henceforth MP model) has become a standard framework for analyzing aggregate labor markets. However, the MP model has recently been criticized for its inability to explain key business cycle properties of the U.S. labor market (Costain and Reiter, 2008; Hall, 2005; Shimer, 2005) . 1 Shimer (2005) demonstrates that the MP model cannot generate the observed unemployment and vacancy ‡uctuations in response to reasonable shocks. Many solutions have been proposed to solve this problem. Some examples are wage rigidity (Hall, 2005; Shimer, 2005) , di¤er-ent calibration strategies (Hagedorn and Manovskii, 2008 ), on-the-job search (Krause and Lubik, 2007; Nagypál, 2007; Tasci, 2006) and informational rents (Kennan, 2010) .
In this paper, I incorporate capital investment into a search and matching model, …nding that its inclusion improves the ability of the model to explain the cyclical volatility of unemployment and vacancies.
Capital investment plays an important role over the business cycle. Firms' investment decisions a¤ect whether they open new vacancies or shut down jobs. 2 Therefore, incorporating capital investment seems to be a natural extension of the standard search and matching model.
I develop an endogenous job separation matching model in which a …rm's capital investment decision is endogenously determined. In the model, when a …rm meets a worker, the …rm pays a capital installation cost and rents capital. A …rm can increase its pro…t by adjusting its capital level, so capital investment in ‡uences the …rm's job creation and separation decisions. The incorporation of capital investment ampli…es the response of labor market variables to productivity shocks. A rise in productivity encourages …rms to invest in more capital. The changes in capital have two e¤ects. First, it further raises the productivity and motivates …rms to post more vacancies. Second, the rise in productivity due to an increase in capital makes job separation more costly. This lowers separations. Thus, capital investment magni…es the impact of the productivity shock on labor market variables through job creation and separation margins.
The incorporation of irreversible capital investment substantially improves the ability of the MP model to account for the observed ‡uctuations in unemployment and vacancies. The calibrated model generates cyclical ‡uctuations in the vacancy-unemployment ratio that are 1.6 times as large as predicted in the standard model. 3 My model explains approximately 75% of the observed ‡uctuations in the vacancyunemployment ratio. This volatility decreases by 25% when job separation is exogenously determined. Thus, the model with endogenous separation generates more responses than one with exogenous separa- 1 Although a large number of related studies has emerged to address this challenge, there has been a few studies which examine whether this failure of the MP model can be observed in other countries as well. See Burgess and Turon (2005) and Zhang (2008) . 2 Den Haan, Ramey and Watson (2000) demonstrate that interaction between capital investment and job destruction plays an important role in propagating shocks in the RBC model. 3 The vacancy-unemployment ratio is the labor market variable that has attracted the most attention in the literature.
tions.
Another important …nding is that my model can generate the procyclicality of the vacancy rate, which the standard endogenous separation model often fails to generate (Shimer, 2005; Ramey, 2008; Mortensen and Nagypál, 2008) . This di¤erent result arises because of the incorporation of capital investment. After incorporating capital investment, job creation becomes relatively more sensitive to productivity shocks than job separation. This generates the procyclicality of vacancies. Mortensen and Nagypál (2007) argue that the MP model fails because of the large di¤erence between labor productivity and the opportunity cost of employment. They show that incorporation of capital costs reduces this gap and generates larger labor market ‡uctuations. 4 Yashiv (2006) and Silva and Toledo (2009) make a similar argument. They demonstrate that the incorporation of labor turnover costs improves the ability of the MP model to explain observed labor market variability. My paper is similar to this work, but provides an additional channel for productivity shocks to generate cyclical ‡uctuations of labor market variables. By explicitly incorporating …rm's capital investment decisions, my model captures the e¤ect of productivity shocks on capital, which a¤ects both job creation and job destruction, and therefore magni…es the impact of productivity shocks on labor market outcomes.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the theoretical model. I develop an endogenous job separation matching model with irreversible capital investment. In Section 3, I calibrate the model parameters. Section 4 presents the results of quantitative statics exercise. I also study the role of endogenous job separation and discuss the sensitivity of the results to calibrated parameter values.
Conclusions and suggestions for future research are presented in Section 5.
The model
Consider an economy consisting of a continuum of workers normalized to one and a large number of identical risk-neutral …rms. Time is continuous. All agents are in…nitely lived and maximize the present discounted value of their income with discount rate r:
A …rm has only one job that can be either …lled or vacant. One job is …lled by one worker. 5 A …rm can produce output if its job is …lled. If it is vacant, the …rm produces no output and searches for a worker.
A worker can be either employed or unemployed. If a worker is employed, he produces output and earns an endogenous wage w but cannot search for other jobs. If he is not employed, he gets ‡ow utility z from non-market activity and searches for a job. When a …rm with a vacant job and an unemployed worker 4 See the version of "More on Unemployment and Vacancy Fluctuations" in the NBER Working Paper Series #11692. 5 In the standard search and matching model, each …rm hires one worker and can post at most one vacancy (Mortensen and Pissarides, 1994; Pissarides, 2000) . Pissarides (2000, Ch. 3) considers a model of large …rms in which each …rm can employ many workers. He shows that a model with large …rms has the same implication as the standard model, under the assumption that wage is determined through bargaining at the individual level.
meet and start producing, it is said that job creation takes place. On the other hand, job separation takes place when a …lled job separates and stops producing. When job separation takes place, the …rm can either reopen a job as a new vacancy or withdraw from the labor market, while the worker becomes unemployed.
Production takes place in …rm-worker pairs. Let the output of each …rm be given by
where p is aggregate productivity, x is match-speci…c idiosyncratic productivity, and k is the amount of capital stock. The production function f (k) satis…es f 0 (k) > 0, f 00 (k) < 0; and the Inada conditions:
I assume that x = 1 when a job is created. 6 A randomly selected fraction s of jobs break up for exogenous reasons and another randomly selected fraction receive a productivity shock that changes each job's idiosyncratic productivity x to some other value x 0 2 [0; 1] according to the c.d.f G(x 0 ). Facing the changed productivity x, the …rm with a …lled job chooses to produce at the new productivity or to close the job. Each …rm chooses a reservation value R; if the …rm-speci…c productivity falls below R, they destroy the job. The reservation productivity is chosen so as to maximize the …rm's present value. When a …lled job is destroyed, the …rm leaves the labor market or reopens a new vacant job. The worker enters the unemployment pool and searches for another job. In order to hire a worker, a …rm posts a vacancy at ‡ow cost . Free entry drives the expected present value of an open vacancy to zero.
When a …rm with a vacancy meets an unemployed worker and an employment contract is signed, the …rm chooses its capital k irreversibly and pays a capital installation cost C(k) and starts to rent capital at rate r. 7 8 The capital installation cost, C(k), satis…es C 0 (k) > 0 and C 00 (k) 0. This capital installation cost is incurred only once at the time of job creation. Capital depreciates continuously over time at a constant rate .
The number of successful job matches per unit time is given by the matching function M (u; v); where u is the number of unemployed workers and v is the number of vacancies. The matching function M (u; v) 6 Under the assumption that …rms know the technology that commands the highest productivity, all jobs are created at maximum idiosyncratic productivity x = 1. Recently, Mortensen and Nagypál (2008) consider a generalized version of the MP model in which this assumption is relaxed. 7 Acemoglu (1999) and Acemoglu and Shimer (1999a, 1999b ) also consider irreversible capital investment in the search and matching model. Partially irreversible capital investment is empirically plausible. 8 I assume that a …rm invests in capital at the moment of job creation. I could set up the model so that the …rm invests over time, not only at the beginning of the employment relationship. Thus, when an idiosyncratic productivity shock hits a …rm, the …rm is allowed to optimally invest in capital. However, in this setup, the role of capital irreversibility weakens.
Furthermore, the extended model will be similar to the original MP model with capital (see Pissarides, 2000, Ch.2), and it is known that adding capital to the standard MP model does not help amplify productivity shocks (see Hagedorn and Manovskii, 2008) . Therefore, in order to focus on the role of irreversible capital investment, I assume that a …rm invests in capital at the beginning of the employment relationship.
is continuous, twice di¤erentiable, increasing in its arguments, and exhibits constant returns to scale. De…ne v=u; which captures the tightness of the labor market. The rate at which a …rm with a vacancy is matched with a worker per unit of time is M (u; v)=v = M (1= ; 1) q( ): Similarly, the rate at which an unemployed worker is matched per unit of time is M (u; v)=u = q( ): Because the matching function has constant-returns, q( ) is decreasing and q( ) is increasing in . In the steadystate, the inverse of the transition rates, 1=q( ) and 1= q( ), are the expected duration of a vacancy and an unemployment, respectively. I also make the standard Inada-type assumptions on M (u; v); which ensure that lim !1 q( ) = 0; lim !0 q( ) = 1; lim !1 q( ) = 0; and lim !0 q( ) = 1:
It is assumed that a wage is determined by Nash bargaining between the …rm and the worker, where the worker has bargaining power 2 (0; 1).
Value functions
A …lled job with idiosyncratic productivity x and k units of capital produces pxf (k) per unit of time, and the employed worker is paid the wage w(x) per unit of time. When an idiosyncratic shock hits the job at Poisson rate , the …rm-speci…c productivity changes from its previous value x to some new value
. If the new value x 0 is larger than the reservation value R, the …rm continues to produce at the new productivity. The …rm stops producing if x 0 < R. The job may be destroyed by an exogenous shock.
The value of a …lled job, the present discounted value of expected pro…t from a …lled job with idiosyncratic productivity x, is denoted by J(x) and satis…es the following Bellman equation;
where V is the value of a vacant job.
The value for an employed worker in a job with productivity x is denoted by W (x). It satis…es
Although all jobs are created at maximum idiosyncratic productivity x = 1, the expected pro…t of a new match will be di¤erent from J(1), as generally de…ned in (1). This is due to the capital installation cost that is paid at the moment of job creation. Therefore, I introduce the notation J n for the expected pro…t of a new match to the …rm. Then, the value of vacancy satis…es
Moreover, the value of an unemployed worker U satis…es
where W n is the value of the worker at the moment of job creation.
Given an initial wage w n , the initial value of a …lled job and an employed worker respectively satisfy
and
The wages are determined through the Nash bargaining between a …rm and a worker over the share of expected future joint income. I assume that, at the initial wage determination stage, the capital installation cost is considered as a loss in joint income. Because of this, there is a di¤erence between the initial wage bargain and subsequent renegotiation. 9 When a …rm and a worker …rst meet, the payo¤ to the …rm equals
; because the …rm incurs capital installation costs. Therefore, the starting wage is determined by the following equation
Once the match is formed, the …rm no longer has to pay the capital installation cost. Thus, the renegotiated wage rate after an arrival of an idiosyncratic shock is given by
The solutions to these optimization problems, w n and w(x), must satisfy the following …rst-order conditions,
respectively.
When an idiosyncratic shock arrives, the …rm can either continue to produce or close the job down.
The optimal decision of the …rm is to continue its production if J(x) V , and to stop its production if J(x) < V . Hence, the reservation value R is determined by the following condition,
In equilibrium, all pro…t opportunities from new jobs are exploited, so that the following free entry condition holds:
expected income at the moment of job creation. Thus, the optimal amount of capital k satis…es
The evolution of unemployment over time is given by
In the steady-state, the unemployment rate is determined by
Characterization of steady-state equilibrium
The steady-state equilibrium is a pro…le fu; ; R; k; w n ; w(x); J n ; J(x); V; W n ; W (x); U g which satis…es the
Bellman equations (1), (2), (3), (4), (5) and (6), the wage equations (7) and (8), the reservation value condition (9), the free entry condition (10), the optimal capital investment condition (11), and the steadystate unemployment rate condition (12) .
The free entry condition (10) together with (3) yields
From (4), (7), (10) , and (13), the value of unemployment rU can be rewritten as
By substituting J(x) and W (x); given by (1) and (2), into (8) , and by using the free entry condition (10) , I obtain
The wage is a weighted average of the ‡ow values of the continuation and destruction of the job match.
Substituting the value of unemployment (14) into the above equation, I get the following expression for the continuation wage
By substituting the wage equation (16) into (1) and imposing (10) , I obtain
Evaluating (17) at x = R with (9) and subtracting this from (17) , I obtain
By substituting J(x); given by (18) , into (17) , I obtain
I can derive the initial wage in a similar manner as the renegotiated wage. Substituting (5) and (6) into (7), and using (8), (10) and (14), I obtain the initial wage rate,
The initial wage di¤ers from the renegotiated wage. Because the capital installation cost is incurred only at the creation of the match, it is shared between the worker and the employer. The initial wage is reduced by the worker's share of the capital installation investment cost (r + +s)C(k). Once a job is created, the capital installation cost is sunk, and it no longer in ‡uences the wage renegotiated after future productivity shocks.
Substituting (10), (18), and (20) into (5) and subtracting (17) evaluated at x = R from it, I get
Making use of (13) and (21), I derive the following equilibrium relationship between labor market tightness and the reservation productivity,
I refer to this as the job creation condition. The job creation condition (22) states that the expected vacancy cost equals the …rm's share of the expected net surplus from a new job match.
The shut-down threshold is derived by evaluating (19) at x = R and by substituting (9) into it. I …nd
I refer to this as the job destruction condition. The left-hand side of (23) is the marginal value of job continuation under the reservation value R. The …rst and second terms represent the current productivity gain, and the third term is the option value of retaining an existing job. On the right-hand side of (23) is the marginal value of destruction (or the marginal opportunity cost of continuation) of a job. The …rst and second terms together is the marginal value of an unemployed worker (see (14) ). (23) says that the optimal reservation value R should be set so as to equalize marginal bene…t of continuation and destruction of the job.
Lastly, I can derive the equilibrium level of capital investment as follows. The reservation value R depends on the amount of capital k since the amount of capital is determined at the time of job creation and the determination of job destruction is made later on. Hence, when a …rm determines its amount of capital, the …rm must take into account its e¤ect on the reservation value R. Noting that the reservation value R must satisfy (23) given k and other endogenous variables, I can totally di¤erentiate (23) with respect to R and k to obtain,
From (10) and (21), I have
Using the above equation and (24), the condition for the optimal capital investment (11) can be expressed
which can be summarized as
One can interpret the above optimal capital investment condition more easily by looking at the …rst line of (25) . An increase in capital investment has two sorts of e¤ects; the productivity in each period increases and the reservation productivity decreases (see the relation (24)). Since the expected life of the job increases, a decrease in the reservation productivity increases the value of the …lled job. The …rst term and third term of the left-hand side of (25) capture the former e¤ect and the latter e¤ect respectively.
The second term of the left-hand side of (25) captures the marginal cost of capital investment. Since the left-hand side of (26) is equivalent to the combination between the …rst and third terms of the bracket in the right-hand side of the …rst line of (25), condition (26) states that in equilibrium the optimal level of capital investment is such that the marginal cost of investment is equal to the expected gain from marginal increase in investment.
The second order condition for the determination of optimal capital investment level is given by
which implies
The system of equations (22), (23), and (26) determine endogenous variables , R, and k. Given and R; equation (12) determines the steady-state equilibrium unemployment rate.
Calibration
In this section, I calibrate the model to match facts about the U.S. labor market. The following 14 parameters have to be determined: the discount rate r, the arrival rate of idiosyncratic shocks , the parameter in the the idiosyncratic productivity distribution , the exogenous job separation rate s, the labor productivity parameter p, the production function parameter , the capital depreciation rate , the two capital investment cost function parameters c 0 and , the two matching function parameters m 0 and , the vacancy cost , the worker's bargaining power ; and the value of leisure z. assume that endogenous job separation accounts for, on average, 35% of total separations. Since I target a total separation rate of 0.036, I set the monthly exogenous separation rate at s = 0:0234.
Following Mortensen and Pissarides (1994), I assume that the idiosyncratic productivity distribution
G is uniform in the range [ ; 1], so that
Following Pissarides (2007) and Elsby and Michaels (2008), the parameter is chosen to match the monthly endogenous job separation rate. 11 I choose the arrival rate of idiosyncratic shocks so that the modelimplied elasticity of the separation rate with respect to productivity shock matches the data. Speci…cally, I use Shimer's (2005) results to set the elasticity of the separation rate with respect to productivity shock at -1.97. 12 Haefke, Sonntag and van Rens (2009) document that wages of newly hired workers strongly respond to aggregate labor market conditions while the wages of workers in ongoing jobs does not ‡uctuate much. The model solutions at these parameter values are shown in Table 2 . Labor market tightness, the job …nding rate of workers, and the separation rate are equal to their calibrated values. The initial wage, w n , is 0.847. The percentage gain in ‡ow receipts when a worker accepts a job is substantial, 100(0:847 0:643)=0:643 = 32%.
Business cycle volatility
Shimer (2005) demonstrates that the standard MP model cannot generate enough cyclical volatility in key labor market variables in US data. Now I consider whether my model can solve this problem. In order to compute the impact of productivity shocks on equilibrium outcomes, I calculate the steady-state response to a 1% increase in aggregate productivity p. I examine the steady-state response as an approximation to 1 5 Hall and Milgrom (2008) use utility parameter values based on the empirical literature on household consumption and labor supply and reports of the e¤ective replacement ratio to estimate the value of z. 1 6 The model can match the target moments, except the elasticity of wages of newly hired workers, which is slightly larger than the target moment. However, since I overstate the ‡exibility in wages of new hires relative to the target moment, if
anything, I make a mistake on the side of generating less ampli…cation. Table 2 reports the model's solutions when aggregate productivity p rises by 1%. Labor market tightness, the job …nding rate, and the vacancy rate are procyclical, while the unemployment rate and the separation rate are countercyclical. Thus, the model is consistent with basic labor market facts.
Column (1) of Table 3 summarizes the main results from my model. In the endogenous separation model, the distribution of idiosyncratic productivity changes in response to productivity shocks; therefore, the mean labor productivity, p, responds less than one-to-one to labor productivity shocks p. 18 Therefore, I report the elasticities of relevant labor market variables with respect to labor productivity p and the mean labor productivity p. For comparison, column (2) shows the corresponding elasticities in the endogenous job separation model without capital investment. Following Nagypál (2007, 2008) and Pissarides (2009) , I use empirical OLS regression coe¢ cients as targets for these elasticities. 19 These data moments are reported in the …rst column of Table 3 . It is worth noting that these data moments are di¤erent from those in Shimer (2005) . Assuming that productivity shocks are the only source of 1 7 Shimer (2005) and Mortensen and Nagypál (2007) demonstrate that steady-state responses of the standard matching model with exogenous job separation are essentially equivalent to the dynamic response of the full stochastic version of it.
Mortensen and Nagypál (2008) show that this argument holds in the matching model with endogenous job separation. 1 8 As seen in Table 2 , higher productivity reduces the reservation productivity. A decline in the reservation productivity reduces the mean of the idiosyncratic productivity of active jobs, so the observed increase in the mean labor productivity, p, is less than the 1% increase in the labor productivity p. 1 9 Mortensen and Nagypál (2007) argue that the empirical equivalent to the change in x relative to changes in y in the matching model in which adjustment of all endogenous variables takes place instantaneously or very fast, "x; y , is the OLS regression coe¢ cient xy x= y , where x and xy represent the standard deviation of ln x and the correlation between ln x and ln y, respectively. ‡uctuations in labor market variables, Shimer (2005) uses the ratio of the standard deviation of the log of the relevant labor market variable to that of log productivity as targets. However, Mortensen and Nagypál (2007) argue that, because there is a small empirical correlation between productivity and labor market variables, assuming that productivity is the unique cause of labor market ‡uctuations is questionable.
Thus, instead of considering the ratios of standard deviations, they gauge the consistency of the model by comparing the empirical OLS coe¢ cients with the model's predictions. The incorporation of irreversible capital investment magni…es the impact of productivity shocks on labor market variables. In the literature, the elasticity of labor market tightness with respect to labor productivity is used to evaluate the performance of the model over the business cycle. The target value for this elasticity is 7.56. In my model, the elasticity is 5.66, which explains 75% of the observed volatility of labor market tightness. On the other hand, the standard matching model with endogenous job separation can explain only half of the observed volatility. Thus, the incorporation of capital investment ampli…es the cyclical variation of labor market tightness.
Irreversible capital investment magni…es the impact of the productivity shocks on labor market tight-ness through the job creation and separation margins. When aggregate productivity rises, …rms respond by investing in more capital, which further increases productivity. First, the higher productivity encourages …rms to post more vacancies. Second, the rise in productivity, due to both the positive shock and the increase in capital, makes the job separation more costly. This lowers the reservation productivity and reduces separations. Thus, the impact of the aggregate productivity shock on job creation and separation is magni…ed due to irreversible capital investment. This leads to a larger volatility in labor market tightness.
Since I choose the parameter to match the elasticity of the job separation rate to productivity, the computed response of the job separation rate to productivity is exactly equal to the one observed in the data. relatively more sensitive to productivity shocks than job separation after incorporating capital investment.
The role of endogenous job separation
The incorporation of irreversible capital investment improves the ability of a matching model with endogenous job separation to explain the observed volatility of labor market variables. Now I assess the contribution of endogenous job separation by examining the exogenous separation version of my model.
The details of this model can be found in Appendix.
In this model, the elasticity of labor market tightness with respect to productivity is
where ( ) = q 0 ( )=q( ) is the elasticity of the matching function with respect to unemployment. Since the job …nding rate equals m 0 1 , the elasticity of the job …nding rate with respect to productivity is given by " f; p = (1 )" ; p . The elasticity of unemployment with respect to productivity is " u; p =
(1 )(1 u)" ; p . The elasticity of vacancies with respect to productivity is " v; p = " u; p + " ; p :
The basic parameter values are the same as before. Since all job separation is exogenous, I set the arrival rate of shocks equal to zero and set the exogenous job separation rate s to match the job separation rate. Thus, s = 0:036. I also recalibrate parameters z and in order to maintain my calibration targets.
The value of the worker's bargaining power is obtained from the steady-state solutions of the model.
In this case, I set z = 0:75, = 0:37, and = 0:52. It is important to note that, for the numerical implementation of the model, c 0 can be eliminated from the equilibrium condition. Therefore, I set c 0 equal to one.
The model implied elasticities of relevant labor market variables are reported in column (3) of Table   3 . For comparison, I also compute the corresponding elasticities in the standard matching model of Pissarides (2000) , the exogenous job separation model without irreversible capital investment, using the same parameter values. The results are reported in column (4) of Table 3 .
Endogenous job separations amplify the response of labor market tightness to productivity shocks. The elasticity of labor market tightness with respect to productivity shocks in the endogenous job separation model is 1:33(= 5:66=4:27) times as larger as one in the exogenous job separation model. The reason of this result is that the former model produces countercyclical separations. Thus, in the boom, the rise in capital also reduces the reservation productivity, leading to lower endogenous job separation. This additional mechanism also helps amplify the change in labor market tightness relative to that of labor productivity.
Sensitivity analysis
Here I discuss the sensitivity of my results to my choice of parameter values. I study how my results vary with the ‡ow value of unemployment z, the curvature parameter of the cost function , and the elasticity parameter in the matching function . When I change these parameters, I also re-calibrate parameters c 0 , z, , , and in order to main my calibration target values. In Table 4 , I report the elasticities of relevant labor market variables with respect to the mean labor productivity unde the re-calibrated parameter values. Table 4 . The change of z is crucial to the result. The elasticity of labor market tightness falls from 5.66 to 2.73. Furthermore, the model generates a countercyclical vacancy rate. These results are because the higher value of non-market activity increases the pro-cyclicality of pro…ts.
Next, I consider the impact of the curvature parameter of the capital investment cost function . The results are reported in columns (3) and (4) of Table 4 . Note that a smaller value of reduces the convexity of the cost function and leads to more capital investment. Since a higher capital investment generates more job creation and less job separation, the model generates a larger volatility of labor market variables.
Recall the bench mark case, i.e., = 1, a one percentage point increase in mean labor productivity leads to an increase in labor market tightness of 5.66%. With = 0:5 and = 1:5, the magnitude of the impact is 6.36% and 5.15%, respectively. Thus, this sensitivity analysis suggests that a smaller value of yields a larger e¤ect of productivity shock on labor market outcomes.
Lastly, I discuss the sensitivity of the results to my choice of the elasticity parameter in the matching function . Mortensen and Nagypál (2007) propose the method to estimate the elasticity parameter in the matching function . Following their method, I obtain = 0:456. The column (4) reports the results under this parameter value. The change in does not substantially alter the elasticities of relevant labor market variables with respect to the mean labor productivity.
Conclusion
In this paper, I study the role of capital investment in a search and matching model. Although the main results will be the same, a fully simulated model yields richer business cycle properties of the model. Several studies have argued that the search and matching model with exogenous separation can match the empirically observed volatility of labor market variables if the wage setting mechanism generates a less procyclical wage. To consider an alternative wage setting mechanism in an endogenous job separation model is also a fruitful avenue for research.
A Appendix
In this Appendix, I develop the exogenous separation version of my model. The basic structure of the model is the same as that of the endogenous separation model in Section 2, but now it is assumed that all jobs are destroyed at the constant rate s and …rm-speci…c productivity is …xed at x = 1.
Let the value of a …rm with a …lled job be J and the value of a …rm with a vacant job be V . Then, they are characterized by the following Bellman equations:
I now turn to a worker's side. Let W denote the value of an employed worker. It satis…es
where U is the value for an unemployed worker. The value of unemployment solves the following equation:
Free entry implies that the value of posting a vacancy is zero. Thus, I have the following free entry condition:
The Nash bargaining solution implies that the wage is set so as to maximize the weighted product of the worker's and …rm's net return from the match. That is,
(1 ) (W U ) = (J V C(k)) ;
where 2 (0; 1) denotes the bargaining power of a worker.
A …rm chooses the amount of capital k to maximize the present-discounted value of its income at the moment of job creation. Thus, the optimal amount of capital k satis…es Combining the free entry condition (A5) with (A2) yields
Substituting the wage into (A1) and using (A8), I obtain the following job creation condition,
By using (A1), (A5), (A7) and the wage equation, I can get the following optimal capital investment condition pf 0 (k) (r + )
The model is recursive. Under the assumptions of production and cost functions, equation (A10) gives the unique equilibrium level of capital investment k. With knowledge of k, the job creation condition (A9)
gives the solution for labor market tightness . And …nally, with , (A11) gives equilibrium unemployment.
